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OLGA TAXIDOU
University of Edinburgh
In an astonishingly evocative scene from Bertolt Brecht’s The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui—his 1941 allegory about the rise of Nazism and in particular its “charismatic,” demagogical leader—Arturo Ui receives lessons in performing political speeches, les-
sons in “electrocution” as the play calls them, from a has-been actor. This scene can be 
read as part of a long genealogy of meta-theatricality, where the medium of performance 
itself is in many ways quoting the longue durée of the anti-theatrical legacy.
What is Brecht doing here in injecting this meditation on Nazism with an equally pow-
erful meditation on the impact of theatricality itself? Is he in some way undermining his 
own play? Is the art of acting itself open to such powers of manipulation and corruption? 
And if this washed-out actor can give lessons to a would-be dictator, how are we as the 
spectators of this scene protected from being manipulated by the play itself? Who has 
the last laugh here? Is there ethically and politically good acting and bad acting? In con-
flating the roles of the actor and the politician, this scene foregrounds the constitutive 
relationships between the two. In a sense, this taps into the long-standing interface be-
tween the “performative” as a philosophical/critical category and actual performance 
conventions. Does the style/manner/form of presentation and performance matter as 
much as the content itself? At the same time, the scene also quotes the equally entangled 
relationship between theatre and democracy, as Brecht is primarily concerned with the 
power of theatre to unmask false democracy.
Brecht’s own proposal of Epic Theatre does offer some responses to the above questions 
and purports to expose some of the pretences or failures of democracy itself. What I 
would like to reflect on for the purposes of this brief excursion is the long tradition that 
this scene quotes and enacts on the stage. This is a tradition as old as Plato’s fear of the-
atre and its democratic potential, coined in the brilliant term he uses in Laws, “theatro-
cracy,”1 revived in the anti-theatrical tracts of the seventeenth century as evidenced in 
William Prynne’s magisterial Histriomastix (2017 [1633]): the Player’s Scourge, or Actor’s 
Tragedy, which at once looks back to Plato and forward to Antonin Artaud (and the 
Theatre as the Plague), and enacted in the heretical Marxism of Guy Debord’s manifesto 
The Society of the Spectacle (1995 [1967]).2 These three diverse but iconic tracts share 
1   See Plato (1999:1225–1513). Plato writes: “By compositions of such a kind and discourse to the same 
effect, they naturally inspired the multitude with a contempt of musical law, and a conceit of their 
competence as judges. Thus our once silent audiences have found a voice, in the persuasion that they 
understood what is good and bad in art; the sovereignty of the best, aristocracy, has given way to an evil 
sovereignty of the audience, a theatrocracy.” (my emphasis)
2   For the ways anti-theatricality is articulated in Renaissance England as part of the puritanical debate see 
Prynne (2017 [1633]). For insightful reflections on this and on Plato’s theatrocracy see Fisher (2017). 
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the fear and loathing of theatre and spectacularization more generally. These instances 
of the fear of theatre’s supplementarity, its ability to stand in and for the world but also 
to always not fully or truthfully represent it, all bear distinctively Platonic traces. Indeed, 
we could claim that Brecht himself might, in some ways, be read as a Neo-Platonist, only 
for him the power of theatre to move us, to make us feel at home or strange is not a neg-
ative quality. I would like to tease out some of these constellations of ideas that link the 
political to the theatrical and spectacular through a reading of the function of the actor.
In its classical Greek etymology, a hupocrites is not someone that tries to deceive us, 
that says one thing and believes another, that sways us through the power of language 
and acting. The Greek term for actor, hupocrites, refers to the actors who were separate 
from the chorus, and responded to it; they were the answerers, both under (hupo) and 
separate (krinein) from the chorus (with Thespis as the first to enact this, according to 
the story or myth of the primal scene of the genesis of theatre). And the term has been 
read as morally neutral. I am not convinced, however, that it was all that neutral. If we 
add to the term krinein its other connotations of judgment and possibly even its later 
rendition as critique, then one possible reading of hupocrites is that this is a performer 
who is indeed under constant judgment, in dramatic contests, as an ideal or flawed rep-
resentative citizen of the democracy that was structurally constitutive of the art-form 
of theatre itself. It is indeed this ability of theatre to create in the audience what Plato 
considered an illusion of judgment, that he found so abhorrent (“a conceit of their com-
petence as judges. Thus, our once silent audiences have found a voice,” as he states).3 In 
its Christian rendition, this anti-theatrical prejudice associated with acting acquires all 
the negative connotations of deceitfulness and manipulation. In Matthew (23:1–39), 
Jesus lists the seven woes of hypocrisy and recognises the “bad faith” of the Pharisees by 
accusing them of manipulating language, “Why are you trying to trip me up, you hypo-
crites?.” However, classical Greek acting was not about pretending to be something one 
was not, it was about performing that role, enacting it, demonstrating it through very 
specific conventions like masks (which later also become metaphors of deception). So, 
when Aristotle uses the verb hupokrinesthai, he is not stating that an actor is pretending 
to be a king or any other role (literally a pretender), but that he (and it was a “he” as the 
classical Greek stage only featured male actors) is demonstrating, showing the function 
or role of the king, and of kingship itself. There is no conflation of actor and role, and the 
term hupocrites in the Greek sense enacts that distance, separation, that crisis/critique 
(krinein) that can act as a safeguard against manipulation.
Fear of hypocrisy in its post-Christian sense always parallels fears about the limitations 
of democracy itself (hence the scene mentioned above in Brecht’s play). Is democracy a 
For the Modernist articulation of anti-theatricality see amongst others, Artaud (1976). In its most 
radical and aphoristic mode, this critique of theatre’s distorting powers appears in Guy Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle. Written in 1967, it came to act as the manifesto of Situationism, expressing the 
repudiation of the spectacle as the quintessential political tool of capitalism.
3  See note 1.
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hypocritical system that purports one thing and practises another? What happens when 
politicians are “pretenders” and claim to be the king rather than demonstrate a role, or 
occupy a position? The political theorist and psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis calls 
democracy “a tragic regime” (1997:84–107)4 stressing that in a democracy there is no 
external force or archē. It is a regime of self-limitation, and possibly hence the tendency 
toward hubris, as limits—moral/political/aesthetic—almost invariably invite transgres-
sion. For Plato, philosophers are the ideal intellectuals/rulers of his ideal city. Democra-
cy was problematic because “poets” were its intellectuals and theater was its phantasmic 
other. When Shelley pronounced poets to be the “unacknowledged legislators of the 
world,” he was articulating a defense of poetry but also of theatricality. Could actors oc-
cupy such a privileged position in a democracy? If democracy is somehow inherently 
tragic and theatrical, are not politicians its main actors? And what is at stake when the 
performative function of politics is conflated with the performance of politics itself? Per-
haps that is why the most unconvincing and difficult emotion for a politician to portray 
is sincerity itself.
If democracy is a tragic regime, then theatre and theatricality more generally could be 
its primary aesthetic trope. And I refer to the aesthetic here in its Greek sense (aesthe-
sis), as located and experienced through the senses, through the body. Just as tragedy 
is not political theory or simply an exposition of ideas, perhaps democracy too has an 
aesthetic dimension that makes it more open-ended and ambivalent. Perhaps this is one 
of the reasons the classical Greeks considered tragedy to be the great school of Athenian 
democracy, one that at once celebrated its achievements but also highlighted its exclu-
sions (women and slaves, for example). Aesthetic education in this sense is also political 
education. Interestingly, as Castoriades claims, tragedy was central to both experiences.
As an example, I would like to propose a reading of a scene from Thucydides’ History of 
the Peloponnesian War where aesthetic form is integral to its politics and to its modern 
readability (Castoriades also reads the History as an example of tragic form). I would 
like to focus on the famous Melian Dialogue that has become such a canonical text for 
contemporary International Relations. It is significant that it is written as a dialogue, 
and follows a theatrical structure. It is as if at this catastrophic moment when Athenian 
democracy is at its worst and its limits are tested, Thucydides transforms from a historian 
into a poet (as playwrights were called in his time). What more powerful way to voice a 
critique of Athenian democracy than through its finest aesthetic form, the tragedy. This 
offers Thucydides and us the power of krinein of judgment through distance, through 
separation, and not solely through identification and empathy. Or to phrase it differently 
by referring to Aristotle’s famous definition of tragedy, we experience the catastrophe of 
Melos through both pity/eleos (empathy, identification) and fear/phobos (awe, wonder, 
distance). Eleos and phobos are fundamental emotions generated by actors/hupocrites, 
but they are also formal tropes of reception. Too much empathy can easily dissolve into 
narcissism (as in the mythological character who could only identify through sameness) 
4 For an insightful meditation on this idea, see Gourgouris (2014:809–818).
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and too much distance can end up in complete alienation (otherness). And these tropes 
have generated aesthetic forms of reception, forms of reception that also come with a 
political dimension. We as readers are transformed into spectators, watching a tragedy 
enacted, indeed one whose themes would also be addressed in an actual tragedy per-
formed in Athens in the same year as the catastrophe of Melos, Euripides’ Trojan Women. 
Our experience of reading is transformed into a performative event.
So the parallels that Brecht examines between lessons in acting and lessons in political 
economy are not coincidental. In a sense, the most democratic politician would occupy 
the gestus of the Brechtian actor or the Athenian hupocrites, where being and demon-
strating are not conflated and the performance of politics is always aware of its own per-
formativity (and accordingly the least democratic actor/politician like Brecht’s Arturo 
Ui would be one who is trying to convince us that they are sincere, “real”). Brecht wrote 
the play in dark times, when there was much at stake in the political ramifications of 
theatricality. In our own times, when the term performativity is sometimes used ahistor-
ically and apolitically, it is perhaps equally important to stress that it comes with a long 
and distinguished genealogy of both form and content.5 And to repeat a much quoted 
aphorism from that play, these matters have an added urgency today, as “the bitch that 
bore him is in heat again.”
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